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1.  Introduction 
The history of banking around the world has been punctuated at relatively frequent 
intervals by episodes of crisis.  Failures of banks have often been sudden – with 
depositors scrambling to withdraw their funds or refusing to renew their maturing 
deposits. They have been costly, both in direct cash costs to bank creditors or to the 
governments who have bailed them out and indirectly in the associated spillover 
effects on economic activity including that caused by reduced access to credit.  
Although some financial crises have had their focus elsewhere, as in government debt, 
exchange rate and stock market crises, banks have typically played a central or 
important supporting role.   
Although bank solvency is often the victim of adverse shocks arising 
elsewhere in the economy, and while panic can result in unnecessarily large and 
damaging depositor withdrawals, this chapter argues that the most damaging of 
systemic banking crises have ultimately involved or were significantly exacerbated by 
what we call bad banking and bad policies – those that permitted or encouraged bad 
banking.  Following each crisis there is an inevitable chorus of calls for more official 
prudential regulation and supervision to prevent a recurrence.  However, the cross-
country empirical evidence suggests that policy is best directed towards ensuring a 
degree of market discipline on the behavior of bankers, as well as paying great 
attention to the incentives in the financial system.  
Section 2 briefly sketches the historical background, noting the ‘boom in 
busts’ of the post-Bretton Woods period following a thirty year lull.  Not all crises are 
                                                  
1 Forthcoming in Allan Berger, Philip Molyneux and John Wilson, eds., The Oxford 
Handbood of Banking, Oxford University Press, 2008. The authors are, respectively, 
Professor of Economics and Chair of the Center for Development Economics at Williams 
College, and Professor of International Financial Economics and Development, Trinity 
College, Dublin.  They would like to thank Thorsten Beck, Roger Bolton, Stijn Claessens, 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt, James Hanson, Luc Laeven, Philip Lane, Millard Long, Peter Montiel, 
Steven Nafziger, Sergio Schmukler, and Andrew Sheng for comments.  Nonetheless, the 
responsibility for any errors and omissions lies with the authors. the same and Section 3 highlights the distinct role of mismanagement, government 
interference and macroeconomic shocks.  Section 4 reviews the aspects of crises 
which have received attention from economic theoreticians seeking to understand 
their recurrence and severity.  Section 5 discusses the costs of crises.  The size of 
these explains the importance of prevention and corrective policy and these are 
discussed in Section 6. In conclusion, Section 7 suggests that, despite a reduction in 
their frequency in the early years of the new millennium, it would be premature to 
suppose that the history of banking crises is at an end.  
 
2.  Early history 
It is no exaggeration to say that banking crises – for now, the widespread insolvency 
of banks leading to closures, mergers, takeovers, or injections of government 
resources – are virtually as old as banking.  When modern banking emerged as a 
development of money changing in 13
th Century Europe, bankers faced information 
problems more severe than in the least developed countries today.  Clients’ trade was 
subjected to a variety of shocks – wars, plague, shortage of coins, losses in trade (e.g. 
ships sinking or being plundered), defalcation by borrowers, etc. – that made lending 
hazardous.  And depositors faced the risk that their bankers would not survive these 
shocks, or would themselves abscond with funds.  Repeated failures led to some 
drastic remedies: a Barcelonan banker was executed in front of his failed bank in 1360 
– a far cry from the limited liability that protected bank owners in later times (Kohn, 
forthcoming, Chap 8). Sovereigns were less likely to incur such extreme sanctions 
when they were the source of the problem, and bankers often succumbed to the 
temptation or were required (literally for their survival) to lend to the monarch.  Such 
famous early Italian banking houses as the Riccardi of Lucca, the Bardi, the Peruzzi 
and even the illustrious Medici of Florence, owed their banking downfall in whole or 
large part to kings and princes that would not or could not repay. Financing the loser 
in a war was a sure route to failure, but even winners reneged, leading to a higher 
interest rate spread on loans to kings and princes than to the more business-minded 
town governments (Homer and Sylla, 1996, p. 94).     
  That bank failures have come in waves is suggested by the list assembled by 
Kindleberger (1978, and with Aliber, 2005) and covering mostly the more advanced 
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th century, and which displays for example  the rather regular 
10-yearly recurrence of crises through most of the 19
th Century (with perhaps a lull in 
the fourth quarter) and through to the second World War.  Emerging economies 
experienced a higher frequency of crises in the interwar period (Bordo et al., 2001).  
The post-WWII era saw a period of exceptional quiescence that lasted through the 
early 1970s.  Against the background of a relatively benign macroeconomic 
environment, regulations that restricted banking competition and product innovation, 
including cross-border activities, likely contributed to this stability.  Gradually, 
however, these regulations became unsustainable as communications technology and 
financial innovation (including the emergence of nearbank competitors) led to 
evasion.   
Liberalization of banking and of capital flows, together with increasingly 
volatile macroeconomic conditions (themselves associated with weakened fiscal 
discipline, the abandonment of the Bretton Woods exchange rate pegs and surges in 
inflation rates) were followed by a return to banking crises at a frequency comparable 
to what had been experienced before.  Already by 1997, over three out of every five 
member states of the IMF had experienced banking problems severe enough to be 
regarded as systemic or at least borderline systemic (Lindgren et al. 1996, Caprio et 
al. 2005).  But the etiology of these crises varied.   
 
3. Diverse origins: management, government, macroeconomics in recent crises 
Many of the most spectacular systemic banking crises of recent decades have been 
inextricably linked with macroeconomic crises in a way that makes the direction of 
causality hard to unravel.  However, it is important not to neglect the role of fraud and 
mismanagement, on the one hand, and government interference, on the other.  Indeed, 
one or other of these two – bad banking and bad policies
2 – has been at the root of 
quite a number of systemic banking crises, especially in the developing world 
                                                  
2 We use ‘bad banking’ to embrace a range of management practice from fraud, to 
miscalculations of risk, to deliberate exploitation of the put option inherent in deposit 
insurance, that heightens the likelihood of bank failure. Of course all banking involves risk, 
not least because of the ever-present information problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, but these are managed and adequately priced in normal banking operation. Pressure of 
circumstances can turn good bankers into bad bankers, as is graphically characterized by de 
Juan (2002). 
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Two very large bank failures in the Caribbean area can be taken as classic 
examples where fraud or mismanagement were at the root of the problem, namely that 
in Venezuela (1994) and the Dominican Republic (2003).  Both appear to be cases of 
the diverted deposits fraud, in which some of the deposits accepted by the bank are 
not recorded as liabilities and the corresponding resources are looted by insiders even 
though the bank still appears solvent on paper and even though its recorded assets 
may be properly performing.  In each of these cases, the bank involved was of 
systemic importance
3 and the sums were so large that the loans  that eventually were 
made by the central bank to enable the bank to make the depositors whole, 
destabilized the macroeconomy. And in Venezuela, high deposit rates in the rogue 
bank forced up rates, and risk taking, at other banks. Another very large failure in 
which the diverted deposits fraud appears to have been present was that of the 
international group BCCI.  This group, headquartered in Luxembourg and London, 
was operating in about 70 countries and its failure was of systemic importance in 
some African countries where it had attained a sizable market share (cf. Herring, 
2005). The diverted deposits fraud typically involves the acquiescence of audit 
professionals; the official supervisor can then be hard-pressed to detect such frauds 
because of the complexity of the false accounting structures that are created. 
Inadequate management of rogue traders has caused several sizable bank 
failures, most famously that of Barings Bank in 1995, but although the losses 
involved in some of these cases have run into ten figures, no known cases have been 
of systemic importance. In January 2008 Société Générale reported the largest single 
bank loss (over US$ 7 billion) ever attributed to fraud by a lone rogue trader. 
Typically, the fraud was uncovered in a period of asset market decline following a 
long-run of over-optimism. Other forms of mismanagement weakness can be cited, 
none larger than the case of Credit Lyonnais in the 1990s, where grandiosity and 
exaggerated ambition in lending policy led to the largest single bank loss in the 
industrial world: without the French government’s bailout, CL would have proved 
                                                  
3  The payments system creates a strong short-term interdependency of banks, so that the 
failure of one major bank could disrupt the entire system of payments and short-term credit on 
which much of day-to-day economic activity depends.  For this reason, some banks of 
systemic importance are perceived as being “too big to fail”, and requiring official support for 
their continued operation even if they are insolvent.  
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brought insolvency in 1995 to the long-established Meridien-BIAO bank in Western 
and Central Africa—although that bank had already been severely weakened by the 
effects of government intervention. 
While the Mexican Tequila crisis (1994-5) crystallized around a currency 
collapse, which hit the banks because of speculative derivative contracts that gave 
them a de facto long position on local currency, the underlying weakness of the banks 
was subsequently traced to insider lending and a long period of evasion of minimum 
capitalization requirements dating back to their privatization.  With little shareholder 
equity at stake, banks were free to move out on the risk frontier and lend to the few 
sectors with the highest return, as confirmed by Caprio and Wilson (2000), Haber 
(2005) and Wilson, Saunders, and Caprio (2000).   
Significant regime changes in the economy often devalue both the financial 
and skills portfolio of banks, sharply increasing the risk of a banking crisis.  The 
introduction of new instruments or opportunities for risk taking often leads some to 
take on new risks without adequate attention to their downside potential.  Likewise, 
liberalization of economic policies has definitely been associated with a surge of bank 
failures in countries with weaker information and governance institutions (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).  Liberalization of entry into banking increased 
competitive pressures for banks, liberalization of interest rates heightened repayment 
and market risks, and liberalization of other aspects of economic policy impacted on 
the creditworthiness of borrowers in ways that were not always easy to perceive, often 
entailing large changes in relative prices.  And to the extent that pre-liberalization 
portfolios were controlled, the lifting of controls often led banks to expand 
simultaneously.  However, simultaneous portfolio shifts by the banking sector can 
move asset prices, making the shift look like a safe proposition, as in the case of the 
Malaysian property boom of the late 1970s and early 80s, which led to a mid-1980s 
crisis.   In addition to a skewed portfolio, liberalized banks inherit a staff that is short 
on banking skills, unfortunately just at the moment when they are greatly needed, just 
as the government begins with bank supervisors skilled only in checking that banks 
are complying with various government commands and not at all trained in modern 
risk-based bank supervision.  Although even the best bankers and supervisors would 
be challenged during liberalization, those with weak skills are even more likely to fail.   
  5In particular, the process of economic transition from socialist or planned 
economies proved fertile in banking crises, many of which can be attributed to 
inexperienced or reckless management.  Although the first wave of post-transition 
inflation wiped out much of the real value of their pre-existing deposits, and reduced 
the debt burden of their borrowers, many Transition economy banks – especially in 
Eastern Europe – misjudged the difficulty of credit appraisal especially in the fluid 
conditions of the transition. As a result many made a new round of poor or self-
serving loans, which soon fell into non-performing status.   
Even where Transition was managed without a surge of high inflation, as in 
China and Vietnam, large banking losses were socialized.  Indeed, in China, 
cumulative injections of government funds into the four main government-owned 
banks alone 1998-2006 amounted to over 350 billion dollars, or about 30 per cent of 
2001 GDP, with further injections still considered necessary to restore full 
capitalization on a realistic evaluation of the recoverability of the loan portfolio (see 
Barth and Caprio, 2007; Honohan, 2008).  This, the largest banking bailout in history, 
was accomplished without loss of depositor confidence, reflecting the ability and 
undisputed willingness of the State to ensure that depositors at its banks would not 
suffer.  Indeed, expressed as a percentage of GDP, bank deposits in China have been 
higher than almost anywhere else in the Developing World, aside from offshore 
financial centers. These growing funds were effectively applied up to the mid-1990s 
as a transitional and partial substitute for the former budgetary allocations made under 
the planned system to key unprofitable state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 1998).  Made 
as loans, these could never have been fully serviced, as was gradually recognized 
through the various bank restructuring measures adopted from 1998 on.  The Chinese 
case, then, provides a conspicuous example of how government policy – specifically 
government-directed lending policy – has led to loan losses large enough to erode the 
banks’ capital many times over. 
Many of the poorest developing country economies that were not subject to a 
centrally planned regime also experienced explicit or implicit government policies of 
directed credit.  When these were enforced by statist regimes without regard to the 
viability of the lending banks the result was losses, erosion of capital and a weakening 
of financial autonomy and motivation of bank managers often resulting in insolvency.  
The true financial condition of state-owned or heavily controlled banks of this sort 
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Even in non-socialist economies government influence has often had similar effects.  
A good  example comes from Francophone West Africa where the banks in several 
countries made what proved to be unrecoverable loans to parastatals and government 
suppliers, unwisely taking comfort in the fact that these loans were being rediscounted 
by the regional central banks.  A similar problem arises with provincial governments 
relying on the national authorities to bail out failing provincial banks.  This “tragedy 
of the commons” pattern was observed in Brazil where loan-losses at several large 
provincial (state) banks imposed heavy costs on the central government before they 
were privatized.  
Banks have always been dependent to a degree on the willingness of the state 
to allow them to function profitably.  Even where directed credit is not an issue, 
quasi-fiscal impositions such as unremunerated reserve requirements have weakened 
bank profitability.  Arbitrary exchange rate and exchange control regulations also 
have a tax-like effect.  The most dramatic example of this was the forced conversion 
to local currency of foreign currency deposits and loans at Argentine banks in late 
2001. Because the conversion was not at market rates and furthermore was 
asymmetric, with a much larger effective write-down of bank loans than of bank 
deposits, this arbitrary measure created systemic bank insolvency at a stroke. 
Although the roles of management and government are never irrelevant in a 
banking crisis, what has dominated many of the larger episodes of systemic crisis is a 
dynamic instability in widely-held expectations about macroeconomic and business 
prospects generally.  A wave of over-optimism about economic growth, often 
manifested in a real estate price boom, results in expansion of credit by most banks, 
especially to the sectors specifically favored by the optimism.  The resulting increase 
in leverage often is fuelled in part by capital inflows – as in Mexico and East Asia in 
the 1990s, but also in the recent U.S. ‘subprime’ crisis.  Because of the optimism, 
loan-loss provisioning is lower than will prove necessary, and this for a time is 
justified by low delinquencies as the overall economic boom financed by credit 
expansion makes it easy for borrowers to service their debt.  This could explain by 
itself why rapid credit expansion is a predictor of crises.  In addition, of course, rapid 
credit expansion places stresses on credit appraisal capacity and results in errors even 
conditional on the overall optimism.  Various forms of contagion or herd effect come 
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relax credit approval standards for fear of losing market share.  The formation of 
banker expectations can be influenced by peer observation, magnifying and 
generalizing emerging overconfidence.  As a latecomer to the South Sea Bubble (John 
Martin, of Martin’s Bank) said, ‘…when the rest of the world are mad we must 
imitate them in some measure (Dale, 2004, p. 113).” 
Whereas experienced bankers are normally alert to isolated indications of 
unsound practices among their peers, in contrast, during the euphoria of the boom 
phase, they are unlikely to detect even fatal weaknesses. These waves of over-
optimism are sufficiently rare in any one country for learning to be imperfect.  
Disaster myopia prevails, with decision makers disregarding the relevance of 
historical experience at home and abroad (Guttentag and Herring, 1986).  Eventually, 
however, the unsustainability of the fundamentals on which the credit expansion was 
predicated becomes evident and the process goes into reverse.  Sharp falls in property 
prices reveal the unrecoverability of property-related loans and erode the value of 
collateral, currency depreciation creates insolvency among unhedged borrowers, asset 
sales by distressed borrowers seeking liquidity drive down the prices of other 
securities too, and the resulting economic disruption also undermines the solvency of 
borrowers in unrelated sectors.   
Examples of the boom-and-bust syndrome are provided by the correlated 
crises in Scandinavia around 1990, as well as the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, in 
which extensive failure of banking systems especially in Thailand, Indonesia and 
Korea were associated with currency collapse and a sharp – albeit transitory – 
contraction of economic activity following a long period of rapid growth and capital 
inflows.  The sudden withdrawal of what had previously been readily available 
foreign funds was an aggravating factor in several other crises, notably Chile, 1982.  
Exchange rate collapse too has been a feature in many episodes; indeed, anticipations 
of currency movements during crises can result in sizable depositor withdrawals 
exacerbating bank liquidity problems.  To be sure, in all of these cases, connected 
lending and excessive risk taking were a good part of the story, as they often are in 
large crises (The World Bank, 2001, and Harvey and Roper, 1999). 
It is sometimes possible to point to a specific date at which a systemic crisis 
has crystallized, whether because a depositor run on banks resulted in the suspension 
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management control of failing banks by a government agency. Nevertheless, the true 
underlying solvency of the banks has generally been deteriorating for many months 
before any such crystallization.  If intervention is long-deferred, bank insiders who 
find themselves to be operating an insolvent institution will be tempted to gamble the 
remaining resources on recklessly risky ventures that might just restore the bank’s 
solvency.  More likely, insiders left in charge will choose to loot an insolvent bank by 
covertly diverting as much of its remaining assets to their personal benefit, as appears 
to have been the case for a sizable number of US thrifts in that country’s crisis that 
peaked in 1988-91. 
Even after the existence of a bank solvency crisis has been publicly 
acknowledged, the scale of the crisis is rarely evident at first. Bank insiders have 
many reasons to conceal weaknesses as long as possible.  Almost all recent systemic 
crises have involved several waves of intervention, generally spread over a period of 
months or even years. 
 
4.   Panic and contagion: explaining sudden and fast-moving banking crises 
A sudden and irresistible depositor run, the classic form in which systemic 
crises have been seen as crystallizing, and which dominates the theoretical literature, 
has actually only featured in a minority of recent cases. Even in Argentina, 1995, the 
response of depositors to fears of a spillover from Mexico’s 1994 Tequila event, 
aggregate depositor withdrawals from the system were little more than 20 per cent, 
spread over several months.  In this case the early depositor movements were from 
local banks to foreign banks; it was only when depositor concerns shifted from the 
health of the banks per se to the prospects for the currency peg that they exited the 
system altogether.  This pattern was repeated in 2001, only then depositors were 
justified in that the government did subsequently abandon the currency peg. 
But even if depositor runs are not as common as a reading of textbooks would 
suggest, the sudden onset of correlated bank failure that have characterized some 
systemic banking crisis with widespread consequences for economic activity raises 
the question of what is special about banks that might make banking systems prone to 
such dramatic collapses. 
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factors to this vulnerability.  First, the highly leveraged nature of modern banks; 
second, the degree of maturity transformation (or liquidity creation) with which they 
are associated; third, the demandable or very short-term nature of the bulk of their 
liabilities; fourth, the opaque nature of bank assets; and fifth, the fact that the bulk of 
their assets and liabilities are denominated in fiat currency.  Of course, each of these 
features represents a key contribution of banking to the economy, which is likely part 
of the explanation as to why authorities have not adopted proposals for narrow 
banking – few are disposed to give up these benefits. 
That high leverage has a role seems obvious: it is why much policy effort 
focuses on limiting leverage through capital adequacy regulation (even though the 
risk-reducing goal of such regulation can often be nullified by bankers’ offsetting 
assumption of higher risks in unregulated dimensions).  Opacity also matters: just as 
banks are at an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis borrowers, so too are depositors 
and other creditors (as well as supervisors) in relation to banks.  Much recent theory 
has developed around the second and third of these features (Allen and Gale, 2007).  
It is not just the liquidity problems that can arise if depositors wish to withdraw more 
than expected from a bank that has committed its resources to loans that can be 
liquidated early only at a loss.  There is the consideration that even depositors who 
have no immediate need to withdraw might do so if they foresee a bank failure.  The 
possibility of self-fulfilling depositor panics not based on any fundamental change in 
the bank’s asset portfolio or any special liquidity shock to its depositors has been 
known to theoreticians for decades, though the real-world relevance of self-fulfilling 
panics unwarranted by weak fundamentals has been much debated. From this 
theoretical perspective, there is no difference between the visible retail depositor run 
and the ‘silent run’ of the bank’s wholesale creditors, including other banks through 
the interbank market.  Indeed, in practice it is often the better-informed wholesale 
market that undermines a failing bank’s liquidity and, as in the case of Northern Rock 
in 2007, leads to a run in the retail market.  Better-informed wholesale market 
participants might have reason to suspect that the bank’s problem is less liquidity and 
more solvency.  In theory liquidity runs can lead to insolvency by forcing a ‘fire sale’ 
of assets at unfavorable prices, but in practice it is difficult to distinguish this case 
from insolvency due to excessive risk taking.   
  10One structural feature of banking implicated in panics is the demandable 
nature of deposit liabilities, which has the effect of encouraging early withdrawals 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).  It is “first come-first served” for bank depositors 
(known as “sequential service” in the theoretical literature).  Until an insolvent bank 
closes its doors, early-withdrawing depositors will receive their full deposit, paid out 
of the bank’s liquid assets; while those that arrive too late will bear between them the 
full capital deficiency.  Even a small overall initial deficiency could result in the 
remaining depositors suffering severe losses if enough others have withdrawn before 
the bank is closed.  Awareness of this risk makes astute depositors alert to signs of 
trouble and indeed serves to ensure that there will be an incentive for large depositors 
to monitor the performance of the bank managers.  As is confirmed by well-
documented cases such as that of Continental Illinois bank (Stern and Feldman, 
2004), as well as from less precise information from the changing size distribution of 
deposits in crises in developing countries (Schmukler and Halac, 2005), it is 
wholesale depositors and interbank lenders who have been the first to withdraw. 
Some system-wide bank failures may be simply due to numerous banks being 
hit by a common shock external to the banking system.  But the speed with which 
several very large systemic crises have emerged without apparent warning and the 
depth of the ensuing financial and economic crisis has suggested a contagious 
transmission and amplification of the problems of one bank to others. Furthermore, 
even if the failure of a number of banks is attributable to an exogenous 
macroeconomic shock, the consequences of that failure on aggregate credit 
availability and on the value of asset prices may in turn amplify the macroeconomic 
downturn feeding back again into the banking system. 
Models of contagion focus on different aspects. Contagion can occur through 
depositor panic, as the failure of one bank causes a reassessment by depositors’ of the 
default risks associated with other banks, and the loss of liquidity from one bank 
failure may cause depositors to withdraw from other banks in the system. At the 
broader national level, both such factors seem to have been at work in the 
international crises of 1997-98 and in the liquidity and credit crunch of 2007.  On the 
asset side too, bank distress can be transmitted through the system.  If it forecloses on 
some of its borrowers or is unable to extend credit, a bank’s distress will be spread to 
the customers of those borrowers in turn worsening the loan-loss experience of other 
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for liquidity in asset markets, which drives down prices including of assets used as 
collateral.  Pure informational cascades, where pessimistic opinions of the part of 
some bankers or investors become generalized, have also been studied as channels of 
contagion. The use by banks of the same or similar mechanical risk assessment 
technologies could have the unfortunate effect of coordinating banks’ responses to 
shocks, thereby amplifying their effect (IMF, 2007).  
Models of such feedback can exhibit multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium in 
which investors’ confidence is validated by high asset prices boosting the 
creditworthiness of borrowers with productive and profitable investments, and a bad 
equilibrium where investors’ skepticism is justified by low asset prices, a lack of 
creditworthiness, weak aggregate demand and business and bank insolvency.  The 
equilibrium value of the nominal or real exchange rate is at the heart of several of 
these models, reflecting the central role of currency collapses in some of the largest 
crises. If there are multiple equilibria, the occurrence of a crisis can be considered a 
coordination failure (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 2007). 
 
5.   Costs of crises 
Two approaches have been adopted to calculating the cost of banking crises.  The first 
approach focuses narrowly on the revealed capital deficiency of the banks and 
specifically on the fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs incurred by efforts to indemnify 
depositors of failing institutions.  The other approach has sought to calculate system-
wide economic costs of the failure. The two approaches have generated rather 
different figures for specific events, though on average across countries they come up 
with roughly similar total costs, expressed as a percentage of GDP.  Thus, taking 39 
systemic crises for which both economic costs and fiscal costs have been calculated, 
the fiscal costs—ranging up to 55 per cent of GDP (Argentina, 1982)—averaged 12.5 
per cent, whereas the estimated economic costs—ranging up to 65 per cent of GDP 
(Colombia, 1982)—averaged 14.6 per cent.  The correlation between the two sets of 
costs was only 0.43, however (Hoggarth et al., 2002; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). 
Neither approach to measuring costs is wholly satisfactory.  The fiscal costs 
approach refers to what in principle is a concrete concept, though changing prices, 
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complicate the calculation.  For example, favorable property price movements in 
Norway and Sweden allowed the authorities to recover most if not all of the outlays 
they had initially made in respect of failing banks.  To the extent that the sums 
expended by the authorities are to fill resource gaps resulting from loss-making 
economic activity by borrowers, the fiscal costs can be considered as an estimate of 
true economic costs.  But since some of the fiscal outlays simply go to compensate 
depositors for resources that were diverted to others, and as such represent a transfer, 
this would overstate true economic costs.  On the other hand, the distortions created 
by poor banking practice will have affected decision-making more widely, resulting in 
losses and missed opportunities that are not captured in the fiscal costs. 
Attempts to measure true economic costs from analysis of a dip in growth 
rates around the time of the crisis lack credibility to the extent that the economic 
downturn (which exposed the bank insolvencies) may have been triggered by 
unrelated factors.  To attribute all of the downturn to the banking problems likely 
overstates the costs.  On the other hand, some episodes have not been followed by an 
economic downturn.  These include cases where the impact on economic growth was 
spread over a long number of years. Thus, the calculations are sensitive to the 
conjectural nature of the counterfactual macroeconomic growth path against which 
the actual is compared.  Many crises are preceded by an economic boom, part of 
which was attributed to the excess optimism in banking and in other sectors.  Since 
some part of the boom might have had sound foundations, backing out the sustainable 
path is no simple exercise. 
Even if it is hard to get a precise estimate, it is clear that the aggregate costs of 
banking crises around the world have been very substantial indeed. Total fiscal costs 
of crises in developing countries since the 1970s exceeds USD 1 trillion – a sum far in 
excess of all development aid provided by the advanced economies. The economic 
costs of crises have been felt across the income spectrum with sharp increases in the 
fraction of the population below the poverty line (Honohan, 2005; World Bank, 
2001).  Notwithstanding these costs, some countries – Chile, and Korea, for example 
– have seen their financial system recover nicely from even large crises.  
Unfortunately other countries, notably Argentina, have had numerous crises in the last 
150 years, pointing to a sizable, even critical, benefit from the application of good 
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6.  Crisis response and prevention 
An ounce of prevention 
  The design of regulatory policy and practice that could most effectively reduce 
the risk of banking crises is controversial.  The Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision, established in 1974, has emerged as a standard setter for bank regulation 
and supervision.  In the Basel II Revised Capital Accord, to be implemented in 2008 
and beyond in many countries, the Committee’s approach to prudential regulation 
involves three pillars: capital, supervision and disclosure.  The first pillar defines a 
minimum amount of capital to be held by banks in relation to the risks that they have 
assumed; the second pillar is a supervisory regime to ensure compliance with this 
capital minimum and generally discourage excessive risk-taking; the third pillar 
mandates disclosure of relevant accounting information.  
Unfortunately, Basel 2’s approach to setting required capital is highly 
controversial (Keating et al., 2001) not only because of the difficulty of measuring the 
underlying risks, but because reliance on the mandated approaches could exacerbate 
herding to the extent that banks adopt similar approaches to modeling risk.  
Furthermore, cross-country empirical evidence casts considerable doubt on the merits 
of relying on discretionary action by official supervisors to limit banking failure.  
Specifically, Barth et al (2006) shows that this approach does not seem to help 
prevent banking crises.  Using their database on bank regulation and supervision 
around the world, this study compiled indexes that represented the extent of capital 
regulation, supervisory powers, market monitoring (effectively, the three pillars of 
Basel II) and other regulatory variables, and related them to the development, 
efficiency, vulnerability, integrity (lack of corruption) and governance of the banking 
system, after controlling for other determinants of the latter variables and also dealing 
with concerns about endogeneity.  On vulnerability, they found that none of the three 
pillars explained the probability of a banking crisis (though private monitoring helped 
explain the other endogenous variables of interest).  Instead, this research indicates 
that authorities concerned with reducing the likelihood of a crisis should either not 
adopt or greatly circumscribe deposit insurance, and should encourage banks to 
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such diversification helps explain the large number of failures in the U.S (roughly 
15000 bank failures in the period 1920-1933), compared with Canada (just 1 in the 
period). Although this research is by no means the last word on banking crisis, it 
highlights an approach to regulation that in effect tries to work with market forces, 
rather than supplant them.      
Prevention would be easier if the onset of crises could be predicted, but 
models are better at showing fragility than predicting timing (Demirgűç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005).   With no effective forecasting system, good containment and 
resolution policies are also needed to deal with the next crisis when it comes.  
 
A pound of cure 
When a crisis hits, government has two key roles: as the lender of last resort (LOLR), 
and as organizer or party in the restructuring of troubled entities.  The threat of 
contagion among banks has led many policy makers to intervene to stop a run before 
healthy banks and borrowers are impaired.  Central banks have accepted the role as 
LOLR since the early nineteenth century, though not uniformly or without contention 
(Wood, 2003).  The advice from Bagehot, that the LOLR should lend freely but at a 
penalty rate and only to solvent institutions with good collateral, has become 
conventional wisdom, if not always followed, and his additional lessons – lend 
quickly before a run takes off, and only use the LOLR rarely to avoid moral hazard – 
also are regularly quoted by central bankers.  This seemingly straightforward advice is 
notoriously difficult to apply in practice, as it involves judgments on collateral, 
solvency, and speed.
4   
                                                  
4 LOLR actions need an effective communications strategy if they are to be successful in 
restoring depositors’ confidence. When the UK mid-sized mortgage lender Northern Rock in 
2007 had difficulty in refinancing its mortgage portfolio in the wholesale markets and was 
given exceptional liquidity support by the Bank of England (eventually amounting to the 
equivalent of about US$ 50 billion, the largest such loan in history), the tone of the 
accompanying statements seems to have triggered a retail depositor run so unnerving that the 
authorities issued a temporary open-ended depositor guarantee. It is too soon to know if 
Northern Rock was solvent at the time of its first request.  If it were, the authorities initial 
hesitation to assist may have been inconsistent with Bagehot’s rule; if not, it demonstrates the 
difficulty for the LOLR when insolvent banks are not promptly closed before a run begins.  
This recent case also illustrates the importance of encouraging banks to manage carefully 
their risks, including liquidity positions, which frequent LOLR support will undermine. 
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beyond the scope of this paper (Honohan and Laeven, 2005, and World Bank, 2001). 
In the spirit of Bagehot, it is worth noting that once authorities decide to intervene, it 
is important that their intervention be comprehensive, dealing with all potential 
problem banks especially where depositors fear that they will suffer from bank 
closures.  The failure of the initial policy 1997 bank restructuring package in 
Indonesia (according to the announcement of which only 16 banks would be closed – 
both a much smaller number than had been expected by business opinion and than 
subsequently proved necessary) has been attributed to its less-than-comprehensive 
nature.  Soon all of the private banks were run, with depositors putting their funds in 
what they assumed were safe public banks.  The central bank then extended liquidity 
support to the private banks, who appear to have used the funds to buy foreign 
exchange, exacerbating the decline of the currency (an chronology of the events by 
the IMF experts involved is in Enoch et al., 2001).  In several crises in Argentina, the 
public would run to public sector and foreign banks, from the domestic private banks.    
  In almost all crises, a sizable fraction of the banking system has survived, 
remaining solvent and liquid (Caprio and Honohan, 2005).  An exception: all but one 
of the seven banks in Guinea, accounting for 98 percent of the banking assets in the 
country were deemed insolvent and closed following massive frauds. Interestingly, 
the one bank left open failed several years later.  Although luck can play a part in 
survival, that some banks survive points to the potential for well-managed banks to 
cope with severe shocks, and to the importance of maintaining an incentive structure 
that encourages safe-and-sound banking.  But the survivors may not be easily able or 
willing to expand to fill the gap that would be created if the failed banks are removed 
from the system and often become more conservative in their lending decisions.  
Indeed, post crisis credit crunches are significant contributors to the macroeconomic 
dips noted earlier, which was one of the reasons for the exhortations of Bagehot.  
 
7.   Banking crises: the end of history? 
The early years of the new millennium saw a drop in the frequency of banking 
crises both in developing and high-income economies. Several factors were advanced 
to account for the new stability and some wondered whether banking crises were 
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historically low levels, following the bursting of the tech bubble and the slowdown in 
economic growth in 2001-02.  As in the late-1970s, when real interest rates were 
negative, this led to a flow of capital to developing countries.  Second, some argued 
that, as part of the so-called “great moderation”, macroeconomic policies improved in 
many developing economies with  steadier growth and lower inflation widespread.  
Third and less plausibly, the expansion of deposit insurance to more than 80 countries 
was suggested as a stabilizing factor, though the insurance is typically limited to 
relatively small retail deposits and as such cannot insulate against wholesale runs.  
Fourth, the counterpart of large U.S. current account deficits was an accumulation of 
official foreign exchange reserves in many developing countries, contributing to their 
ability to withstand any sudden stop in capital inflows.  Fifth, banking systems 
appeared relatively well capitalized and robust, attributable perhaps to the 1988 Basel 
I Accord but also an expected response to prior losses and market pressures.  The 
attention focused on risk management since the early 1980s was also cited as a 
decided advantage.  Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the rapid expansion of 
derivatives and securitization led some to believe that the financial system had been 
able to parcel out risk to those who could bear it best.  
Though some of these factors may help explain the lull in banking crises, 
several constants of finance are worth recalling.  The benign macro environment, as 
Rogoff (2006) reminds us, accounted for part of the success in achieving low 
inflation, and cannot be counted on to continue -- as oil price behavior in 2007 
demonstrates.  Low interest rates make many debtors look good, but their subsequent 
rise regularly reveals ‘surprises.’  Although a number of developing countries have 
made significant policy changes, not all of these have been positive (Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine, 2007).  Research cited there and elsewhere, for example, shows that 
deposit insurance increases risk taking.   The large current account imbalances contain 
their own risks, not the least of which is a slowdown of growth in China and/or a 
decrease in the desire to hold U.S. dollar assets in portfolios around the world.  
Beyond these arguments, the financial world received a rude awakening with 
the interbank liquidity crisis and associated ‘credit crunch’ of 2007.  At first this event 
was seen as a new type of crisis, because of the role of derivative securities, but in 
fact it displays many familiar features (cf. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  In particular, 
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responses to financial innovation. At its center were the growing market in US-
originated mortgage-backed securities and the boom in housing prices in many 
industrial countries.  Provided by Basel I with a clear incentive to reduce required 
capital by shifting loans off their balance sheet, banks in the US and other countries 
had increasingly turned to an ‘originate and distribute’ model, in which standardized 
loans, mostly mortgages, could be bundled and sold as securities, thereby leaving the 
originating bank free to use its capital elsewhere.
5  Non–depository financial 
intermediaries jumped into the same business, given the ability to earn fees and yet 
not retain credit risk.  By careful structuring of these securities and in particular their 
priority in receiving cash flow from the servicing of the original portfolios, favorable 
credit ratings were obtained for most of the securities sold, overcoming (it seemed) 
the adverse selection problem that had hitherto prevented such loan sales (buyers 
assumption that sellers would only part with their worst loans). However, knowing 
that the loans they originated would be sold to others reduced the incentive to make 
careful credit assessment.  Indeed, U.S. banks and finance companies originated a 
large number of high-risk mortgages (e.g. no money down, interest only or less as the 
initial payment, with no documentation on borrowers’ capacity to pay and initial 
‘teaser’ interest rates that would adjust upwards even if market rates remained 
constant).  Rating agencies seemed to become the partners of those doing the 
securitization, rather than serving as unbiased arbiters of credit quality.  As the U.S. 
housing market cooled and rates adjusted (from teaser levels, and then with the 
tightening of monetary policy), defaults spread, inducing several of the leading 
international banks to sell equity to strengthen their capital ratios.  Thanks to 
securitization, U.S. banks only held a fraction of the mortgage risk. Instead, the first 
bank failures from the US subprime mortgages were German banks which had taken 
unwarranted risks in this market.  In sum, as with many past crises, a period of low 
interest rates led investors, some intermediaries, and other players to venture further 
out on the risk frontier than was prudent, and the eventual reassessment – the market 
could not keep growing or rising – led to a flight to quality.  Given the opacity of 
banking, it remained uncertain in early 2008 how far the problem would spread, and 
                                                  
5  According to the Basel system, various loans and other assets were assigned different risk 
weights, thereby leading to the incentive to shed assets with a higher risk charge.   
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Thus, although the financial system clearly has been able to parcel out risk, it 
remains true that people are prone to waves of enthusiasm and/or deliberate risk 
taking – bubbles, perhaps – in which they buy assets but appear not to understand 
them, are myopic in their risk assessment, or believe that they can get out (sell to a 
‘greater fool’) before the market collapses.  Securitization doubtlessly facilitates risk 
transfer, but also reduces transparency, making it more difficult to track risk.  If 
market participants do not know which of their counterparties is holding suspect 
assets (those whose prices are under downward pressure), the consequent flight to 
quality can be more pronounced, as seemed evident in 2007.  Such a response could 
make it more difficult for central banks to ‘ring fence’ a solvency problem and 
thereby restore order in financial markets. The emergence of large, complex financial 
intermediaries further complicates the jobs of official supervisor and market monitor.   
The constant factor is the presence of information problems in finance, coupled with 
the regular tendency of investors to venture further out on the risk frontier when real 
returns on safe assets fall. 
Perhaps the best indicator of what is to come in banking is clarified by 
Kindleberger and Aliber’s (2005) listing of crises of the last several centuries: they 
keep recurring.  One can easily imagine earlier generations thinking that surely the 
lessons of costly crises must have been learned, only for them or their descendents to 
see a recurrence.  Financial innovation, changing regulation and regulatory avoidance 
are certain to continue, so future crises might appear different from their antecedents.  
Although depositor panics might continue to be rare – when truly systemic, they 
usually involve a bet of a currency devaluation – credit squeezes appear to be far 
more regular a feature of the financial landscape, regardless of the technology 
involved, with the inevitable role played by information problems that have been and 
remain endemic to finance.  
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